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Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) able to carry out such a sophisticated attack in the heart of
Mumbai? And what lessons does Mumbai hold for strategists seeking to counter other
armed groups around the world? While tactical level lessons from Mumbai have been well
documented, it is important to also consider what the Mumbai attacks tell us at the
strategic and operational levels. Specifically, the Mumbai attacks provide valuable insight
into how armed groups use the maritime environment, and how they use surprise, denial,
and deception to mask intention and invite over-reaction by states. In addition, studying
the Mumbai attacks provides insight into some of the strategic and operational seams and
gaps that armed groups seek to exploit. These include environmental and geographical
factors; institutional, bureaucratic, and jurisdictional seams and gaps between agencies;
cognitive seams and gaps that made the use of the sea by LeT so difficult to conceptualize;
and the diplomatic seams and gaps that led to heightened tensions among states— in this
case, India, Pakistan, and the United States. This article discusses how to categorize these
seams and gaps in order to better address the problems they create, and how states might
best direct and focus their limited resources when faced with similar challenges.
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This article analyzes a single event—the 2008 Mumbai attacks—in order
to consider the strategic and operational lessons for dealing with other
armed groups. How and why was Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) able to carry
out such a sophisticated attack in the heart of Mumbai? And what lessons
does Mumbai hold for strategists seeking to counter other armed groups
around the world? While tactical level lessons from Mumbai have been
well documented, it is important to also consider what the Mumbai
attacks tell us at the strategic and operational levels. Specifically, the
Mumbai attacks provide valuable insight into how armed groups use the
maritime environment, and how they use surprise, denial, and deception
to mask intention and invite over-reaction by states. In addition, studying
the Mumbai attacks provides insight into some of the strategic and operational seams and gaps that armed groups seek to exploit. These include
environmental and geographical factors; institutional, bureaucratic, and
jurisdictional seams and gaps between agencies; cognitive seams and gaps
that made the use of the sea by LeT so difficult to conceptualize; and the
diplomatic seams and gaps that led to heightened tensions among states—
in this case, India, Pakistan, and the United States. This article discusses
how to categorize these seams and gaps in order to better address the
problems they create, and how states might best direct and focus their
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Introduction
"The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does
not know…he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will
be few."2
—Sun Tzu, Art of War
In a sustained and bloody attack from November 26–29, 2008, four
teams of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)—Army of the Righteous—gunmen
attacked ten separate sites in the Indian coastal city of Mumbai. Among
others, the Taj Mahal and Oberoi Trident hotels, the rail terminus, a
women and children's hospital, a Jewish community center, a movie theater, and the Leopold Café were all targeted. Indian police reported that
ten men, nine of whom were killed, carried out the attacks. The gunmen
arrived in the city via a hijacked Indian trawler (MV Kuber) and used
small boats to reach the shore. At this point they hired taxis to drive them
to the first attack sites and planted bombs in the taxis.3 The explosion
from those bombs created further fog, friction, chaos, and uncertainty in
the besieged city. The only attacker who was captured alive, a Pakistani
citizen named Ajmal Kasab, admitted being part of the Pakistani-based
LeT, which is designated a terrorist organization by the United States,
United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan (among others).4 The sophisticated
and carefully coordinated attack stunned Indian officials and the international community. When it was over, 172 people had been killed and at
least 300 were wounded.5
While tactical level lessons from Mumbai have been well documented, it
is important to also consider what the Mumbai attacks tell us at the strategic and operational levels.6 This article analyzes a single event—the
2008 Mumbai attacks—in order to consider the strategic and operational
lessons for dealing with other armed groups. Using a single case study to
draw such lessons is not without its limitations; however, the argument in
this article is that even a single event can provide us with valuable insights
if we use it to evaluate how armed groups exploit seams and gaps to their
advantage.
One of the challenges of using a single case from which to draw lessons is
that many variables in the Mumbai attack could be considered so
unique—sui generis—that generalizable lessons cannot be discerned.
These unique factors include the specific sites targeted, the weapons used,
the police response in Mumbai, and even the geography of Mumbai itself.
In addition, without multiple data sets, it is difficult to test and falsify
20
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hypotheses and to determine whether the four seams and gaps identified
above are exhaustive, whether they should be prioritized, and whether
more should be considered. One might also argue that the challenges of
preventing or successfully disrupting another Mumbai-style attack are
either too great or too specific to the armed group involved to provide
generalizable discussion on how to minimize threats from any armed
groups. Given India's finite resources for security in one city, Mumbai's
coast line, and the determination of the LeT to attack targets in India, it
could also be argued that it is simply too difficult to close seams and gaps,
regardless of the lessons from Mumbai.
These are all valid points. However, the argument in this article is that the
2008 Mumbai attacks are a valuable and rich case study for analysis for
three reasons: the armed group's strategic maturity and strategic evolution; the way the armed group used the maritime environment to its
advantage; and the way this armed group exploited strategic and operational seams and gaps in Indian security forces and between states. These
are discussed in more detail in sections two and three, following a brief
section on methodology. Moreover, although the list of seams and gaps
may not be exhaustive, a brief discussion of other armed groups in the
conclusion helps to broaden the applicability of these lessons.
Finally, in considering current and future irregular challenges, the
purpose of this article is to consider how to minimize the threats and
maximize the opportunities to counter armed groups. India is not alone in
having finite resources to address security challenges. Nor is it alone in
facing a determined armed group that is willing to innovate, and in having
geography that makes it inviting for armed groups to target certain cities
or areas. From the trans-Sahel states in Africa, to the archipelago states in
Southeast Asia, to the states of Latin America, many countries face the
same challenge from armed groups. The argument in this article is that
the Mumbai attacks provide a useful case to consider how states might
best direct and focus their limited resources when faced with similar
challenges. Thus, despite the limitations of a single case study, it is still
important to begin the process of identifying the types of seams and gaps
that armed groups have taken advantage of in order to provide a steppingoff point for further discussion on how to incorporate these strategic and
operational lessons into current and future security planning and
coordination.

21
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Exploiting the Maritime Environment
As the opening quote illustrates, the strategist Sun Tzu warns his readers
not to strike at the place where their adversaries are strongest, but to look
instead for where they are vulnerable.7 Attack their strategies, undermine
their alliances, and seek them out where they are least able to respond, he
advises.8 LeT certainly seems to have taken a leaf from Sun Tzu's book in
the planning and execution of the Mumbai attacks.9 Indeed, the 2008
attacks are a prime example of how armed groups use complex environments to attack where a state is least prepared to respond. Of particular
importance in this assessment are the evolution of LeT's strategies and
the use of the maritime environment by this otherwise land-locked armed
group to attack a coastal city. How and why was LeT able to carry out such
a sophisticated attack in the heart of Mumbai? And what lessons does
Mumbai hold for strategists seeking to counter other armed groups
around the world?
LeT was founded in 1990 as the militant wing of Markaz Daway ul
Irshad (MDI)—Center for Religious Learning and Propagation.10 The
MDI organization, which has its headquarters in Muridke, near Lahore,
Pakistan, uses the combination of its educational programs and LeT's militant activities to develop a jihadi culture. LeT "was meant to equip the
adherents for practical experience in waging jihad."11 According to former
Pakistani policeman turned scholar Hassan Abbas, LeT "prides itself on
introducing suicide bombings into the Kashmir theater" and carries out
attacks in disputed Kashmir territories.12 In June 1999, one of LeT's three
founding leaders, Hafiz Saeed, declared "that LeT was not working for the
liberation of Kashmir alone, but intended to aid the 200 million Muslims
in India."13
The expansion of LeT ambitions to include India made Mumbai a particularly attractive, symbolic target.14 Mumbai is a vibrant city that houses
historical and modern economic, entertainment, cultural, and political
focal points. Home to more than twenty million people, it is the fourthlargest city in the world.15 Mumbai also presents the perfect strategic
communications opportunity for violent groups who wish to draw attention to their actions and instill a sense of fear. As noted above, the four
teams of LeT gunmen that held Mumbai hostage for three days in November 2008 attacked ten separate places throughout the city, giving ample
time and space for media coverage. The Mumbai attackers used focal
points—widely recognized buildings—that were selected to catch public
attention and create a sense of urgency and panic. Moreover, by targeting
landmark buildings where large numbers gather such as the Taj Mahal
and Oberoi Trident hotels and the rail terminus, the sheer number of peo22
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ple involved captivated public attention. This combination of public
attention and urgency created further seams and gaps as the attack
unfolded, placing pressure on the authorities in Mumbai and the Indian
government in New Delhi to act quickly with little time for planning and
coordination. This further invited errors in judgment—strategic and tactical—and the potential for state over-reaction, which created further confusion and fear.16 Finally, the presence of India's Bollywood film studios
assured regional and international media coverage of the events and their
aftermath.17
Several excellent reports have detailed the tactical and operational issues
that made it possible for the 2008 attack to take place and the problems
Indian security forces faced in ending the sieges.18 For example, the death
of the deputy chief of police at Mumbai's central railway station, where
the first attack took place, quickly created a command vacuum. Moreover,
the attackers were more heavily armed than the police officers at the railway station, and their AK-47s were able to completely penetrate the bulletproof vests of the first responders. As a result, and due to the multiple
attack sites, crisis response protocols inside the city were never completely executed, which allowed the LeT teams to move between locations
with impunity. In particular, after the first attack at Mumbai's railway station, the gunmen were able to escape and move on to their next target
even as security forces were attempting to respond to the first attack.19 By
attacking in several places around Mumbai, moving between attack sites,
and planting bombs in taxis, the gunmen were able to dictate the tempo of
the attacks, keep the media focused on events, and sow confusion
amongst police teams.

Getting to Mumbai
As noted above, LeT is widely considered to have training camps inside
Pakistan and Kashmir; thus, in order to plan and carry out the attacks,
they had to solve the issue of how to reach Mumbai. Solving this problem
required both creativity and ingenuity. Mumbai's train system, against
which LeT led an attack on July 11, 2006 resulting in more than 200
deaths and 700 people injured, meant increased but not perfect security
on the rail system. The most obvious and overland routes into India are
both risky and predictable. A truck loaded with explosives making the
long drive into the city would stand a high chance of being stopped and
searched. The LeT reconnaissance team sent to Mumbai prior to the
attacks noted, however, that the boat ride across the bay from the airport
not only provided an excellent view of the city but also exposed how vulnerable Mumbai's coastline was to a maritime approach.20
23

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 4

Journal of Strategic Security

In order to focus the attention of the world on LeT and its agenda, the
group had to solve some perplexing operational and strategic challenges;
for example, how to use the environment, including Mumbai's waterways,
to their advantage to achieve freedom of movement and surprise. This
was no simple feat as India has a coast guard and navy to ensure that
domination of the waves near its shore remained under its control. With a
few exceptions, this coverage is sufficient to guard against the usual maritime suspects, incursions by other states and criminal activities by pirates
and smugglers.21
So, why did LeT attack Mumbai via the sea? How was it able to overcome
the technical and logistical difficulties? What issues does this raise for
consideration of how other armed groups use their environment to their
advantage? First, by arriving via sea, LeT had more options to follow Sun
Tzu's strategic advice, disguise their intentions and conceal their
approach. Even though state-owned navies rule the oceans, their coverage
is far from universal. Moreover, although interdicting access routes or
supply lines is a difficult task whether on land or at sea, it is particularly
tricky at sea. Mumbai is a very busy harbor surrounded by an even busier
waterway. In this case, LeT was counting on the ocean to maintain strategic, operational, and tactical surprise. Their exploitation of the maritime
environment was exceptionally imaginative and rested on their pre-attack
reconnaissance of security features in Mumbai and the advantage that
arriving by sea brought to the gunmen.22 In essence, they were banking
on getting lost in the vast open expanses of the ocean while at sea, and
then getting lost in the crowded commons near the shore.
Second, LeT treated the maritime environment as a line of
communication rather than attempting to establish sea control. Although
LeT had not used the maritime environment for attacks, the group was no
stranger to using the ocean as a conduit for moving goods, people,
supplies, and weapons across the Indian Ocean. They were able to move
swiftly without developing an extensive maritime skill set of their own by
using the sea around Mumbai as a conduit to move gunmen and supplies
rather than a base from which to conduct an attack. They were also able to
minimize the equipment and logistics required to carry out the attack. By
hijacking an Indian trawler (MV Kuber) while it was still outside of Indian
waters and killing the crew, LeT was able to use the ship's captain to drive
the vessel into coastal waters undetected.23 Moreover, as discussed in
more detail below, interoperability issues and confusion over maritime
areas of responsibility among the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, and coastal
police forces made it possible for the four teams to slip into the city
unchallenged.24
24
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While this was an innovative way for LeT to use the maritime environment, other groups like the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have led the way in
using the oceans as conduits for moving supplies and even amphibious
landings. For example, the Tamil "Sea Tigers" developed into a 3,000strong force that carried out suicide attacks at sea, smuggled weapons and
supplies across the Polk Straight between Sri Lanka and India, and ferried
weapons from warehouse "mother ships" deep in the Indian Ocean.25
Certainly, this is an extreme example of what a well-funded armed group
is capable of.26 However, both the Tamil Tigers and LeT's use of the maritime environment serve as reminders that armed groups can use the
oceans and littorals to their advantage—and that states overlook these
strategic capabilities to their peril.
In summary, this section discussed how LeT specifically used the maritime environment to its advantage and how it took advantage of other
strategic and operational seams. This brief survey of the 2008 Mumbai
attacks reveals some of the strategies that LeT used to their advantage.
These included:
• The use of surprise, denial, and deception to mask their approach and
cause confusion during the attacks;
• The use of the maritime environment to create strategic and operational freedom of movement;
• Creating strategic communications seams and gaps by inviting overreaction and dictating timing and operational tempo.

Exploiting Seams and Closing Gaps
In addition to providing us with an opportunity to think about how armed
groups use their environment to their advantage, the Mumbai attacks are
a reminder of how armed groups exploit seams and gaps in security coverage. It is common practice for states to draw lines separating operational,
jurisdictional, and territorial lines of authority that flow from land to littorals, to sea, to land across international boundaries. Although the intent is
to make distinct boundaries between different areas of authority, these
lines often create seams that a host of actors exploit. This section discusses these seams and gaps more generally and argues that armed
groups are particularly adept at exploiting four key seams and gaps: The
environmental and geographical factors discussed previously; the institutional, bureaucratic, and jurisdictional seams and gaps between agencies;
the cognitive seams and gaps that made the use of the sea by armed
25
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groups difficult to conceptualize; and the diplomatic seams and gaps that
led to heightened tensions among India, Pakistan, and the United States.
The Mumbai attacks exposed the institutional seams among the Indian
Navy, Coast Guard, and Coastal Police. There was a tangible seam in
terms of areas of responsibility, as well as seams in communication, information sharing, and interoperability. As a result, security around Mumbai
was split between an outer layer (deep sea) that was given to the Indian
Navy, and an inner layer (littorals and close to ports and beaches) that
was the responsibility of the Coast Guard. These artificial lines and confused authorities created numerous blind spots that LeT took advantage
of. Indeed, the hijacked trawler, the MV Kuber, was able to pass through
the Indian Navy's jurisdiction and into the Coast Guard's jurisdiction
without being stopped.27
Looking back at the attacks with 20/20 hindsight, it certainly seems that
the maritime approach offered a potential point of failure for LeT, and
was probably the last best point at which the attacks could have been prevented. This raises the question of what the Indian security agencies—and
other states with similar challenges—could have done to close these seams
and gaps, given the busy waterway and finite resources. For starters, practical skills sets and habits of cooperation are developed by training
together, but the Indian Navy had discontinued joint coastal patrolling off
the Mumbai coast after September 2005, and by 2008 neither the Navy
nor the Coast Guard had practiced working together in joint operations.
As a result, there was little understanding of the limits of their joint capabilities and coverage and the blind spots that standard operating procedures created. This lack of practical experience in working together was
complicated by an inability to share intelligence or even best practices.28
Coupled with confused jurisdictions, this created a seamed environment
in which there was no easy method to coordinate information or to act on
information if it were coordinated.29
Of course, this issue of confused jurisdictions and seams between areas of
responsibilities, as well as lack of interoperability and cooperation is certainly not limited to the Indian security forces and the Mumbai attacks.
The 9/11 Commission Report, for example, argues that all of these factors,
and others, contributed to the seams that the 9/11 hijackers exploited in
the attacks against the United States on September 2001.30 Moreover,
developing habits of cooperation, interoperability, and intelligence sharing, and working through legal and national limitations continue to challenge defense and security professionals in the United States, despite the
creation of an overarching bureaucracy—the Department of Homeland
Security—to coordinate efforts among the agencies responsible for
26
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domestic security.31 Competing interests, budgetary issues, institutional
culture, bureaucratic inertia, standard operation procedures, and training
schedules compound these difficulties at the strategic level. Additionally,
as the cross-Strait activities of al-Qaida in Yemen and Somalia have demonstrated, even the divisions of geographic areas among military areas of
responsibilities—such as Combatant Commands and Task Forces—create
seams and gaps in coverage and coordination that armed groups
exploit.32
Second, this case draws our attention to cognitive seams and gaps, the
factors that the 9/11 Commission Report called "failures in imagination."33 In this case, the cognitive seam—the failure in imagination—was
the use of the maritime environment as a conduit for an attack.
Although command of the high seas may belong to the world's state
navies, armed groups use the world's waterways—oceans, littorals, rivers,
and swamps—as conduits for flows of people, goods, drugs, weapons, and
money. The Mediterranean and the vast Indian Ocean region, which
extends from the south and east African coasts across to the Indonesian
and Philippine archipelagos, is awash with tankers, freighters, and tiny
dhows that flow undetected and unchallenged across the world's oceans.
Armed groups are used to operating clandestinely, and since they don't
typically need to develop dockyards and training academies, they can be
very creative at hiding their vessels and operational preparation. For
example, some armed groups such as the Tamil Tigers and narcotraffickers in Colombia have developed their own indigenous maritime
capabilities of converting seemingly innocuous vessels into suicide-attack
craft, in addition to submersibles, fast attack boats, and even warehouse
mother ships to resupply weapons.34
However, as the Mumbai attacks demonstrate, states continue to be
surprised by the innovative use of the maritime domain by armed groups.
One reason is that states mainly focus their intelligence assessments on
other states. In the twenty-first century, the development and exertion of
naval power includes the ability to disrupt the free flow of goods and oil
on which the global economy depends. Iran's 2012 threats to close off the
Straits of Hormuzin response to the threat of EU oil sanctions are a good
example of this; in response, the United States, Britain, and France sent
an aircraft carrier and six warships to pass through the Straits.35 In
comparison to the complex regional and international security issues that
surround the development of Chinese or Iranian naval capabilities, it is
understandable that the use of the oceans by armed groups can be

27
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overlooked. The strategic repercussions of the Mumbai attacks on IndoPakistani relations, however, demonstrate the costs of continuing to
overlook armed groups at sea.
States ignore the use of the maritime domain by armed groups at their
peril. To give but one example, al-Qaida operatives and affiliates
attempted at least eighteen major attacks on or via the ocean between
1998 and 2011. In addition to the attack on the USS Cole, these included
attacks on private yachts, the delivery of explosives for the Tanzania and
Kenya embassy bombings in 1998, a successful attack on the French oil
tanker Limburg in 2002 near Yemen, and attacks on oil tankers off the
coast of Iraq in 2004.36 Given the advantages of surprise and deception
that using the maritime domain confers, it is less surprising that LeT used
the ocean for the Mumbai attacks and more a question of which other
armed groups might follow suit.
The 2008 Mumbai attacks also serve as an important reminder of how
armed groups and states can exploit intangible seams and gaps such as
diplomatic tensions between states to their advantage. In the case of
Mumbai, the attacks seemed intended to further exacerbate tensions
between Indian and Pakistan, and between India's Muslim and Hindu
populations. LeT's attacks in Kashmir against Indian troops are well
known, and many observers consider LeT to be acting with the support—
either concrete or tacit—of Pakistani intelligence officers.37 This raised
the stakes for both India and Pakistan during the 2008 attacks and elevated the risk of an event with regional consequences. Indeed, given this
context and the very public nature of the attacks, the diplomatic and military restraint both states showed during the attacks and in the aftermath
was probably a bitter disappointment to LeT and its supporters. However,
the attacks also raise the issue of how an armed group can exploit its tactical success to escalate strategic tensions. Had India been less restrained
in its reaction to the shocking and prolonged siege in Mumbai, it is conceivable that LeT might very well have provoked another deep-freeze in
relations between Indian and Pakistan, or even another hot war in the
Kashmir region.
The ability of armed groups to affect local, regional, and even international security is not limited to LeT and is certainly not limited to IndiaPakistan relations. In 2006, for example, Israel's reaction to Hezbollah's
kidnapping of Israeli Defense Force officers quickly escalated into a hot
conflict across the Israeli-Lebanese border. Moreover, when the crossborder shelling had subsided, Hezbollah took advantage of the destruction caused by Israeli rockets in order to further extend its networks of
power and patronage in Southern Lebanon. The conflict also undermined
28
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the Lebanese government's legitimacy and authority and raised serious
doubts about its ability to hold onto power.38 The timing of the 2008
Mumbai attacks was unfortunate from a U.S. perspective, given the delicate diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Pakistan to
put pressure on Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida leadership thought to be
hiding in the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) region of Pakistan. The attacks were intended to divert Pakistani attention on the new
tensions with India, as well as to its own troops in the Kashmir region,
leaving little spare energy to support U.S. adventures in FATA.39
Finally, despite this seemingly dire assessment of how non-state armed
groups use the environment to their advantage and exploit seams and
gaps, there is reason to be hopeful. States do prevail against armed groups
on a regular basis, and attacks such as Mumbai are memorable in part for
their rarity. For example, the Sri Lankan government successfully disrupted and defeated the Tamil Tigers, who were extremely adept at
exploiting seams. In addition to transforming their own navy to cover
maritime gaps, the Sri Lankan government was able to disrupt and
degrade the fundraising activities of the LTTE among the Tamil diaspora
in Canada, UK, and India.40 Unfortunately, these cases point to the reality
that a lot of time, blood, treasure, and political capital are typically
expended before states learn which seams and gaps armed groups are taking advantage of and how to close those gaps.

Conclusion
In conclusion, this article used the example of the 2008 Mumbai attacks
carried out by LeT to analyze how armed groups can use the maritime
domain as a conduit for clandestine attacks. The case also illustrates how
an armed group can exploit four different types of seams: environmental
and geographical; institutional; cognitive; and alliances and coalitions.
• The environmental and geographic factors included Mumbai's
geographical position as a bustling coastal city with crowded coastal
waters.
• The institutional factors included institutional inertia, entrenched
bureaucratic interests, standard operating procedures and routines
that resulted in interoperability, blind spots, and limited habits of
cooperation between maritime agencies, legal authorities, and
jurisdictions.

29
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• The cognitive factors included the failure to recognize that the LeT
and other armed groups use the Indian Ocean to move goods, people,
weapons, and money, and that attacking Mumbai from the sea,
whether through an amphibious landing or small boats laden with
explosives, was well within their imagination.
• The diplomatic and alliance factors included the tensions
between states—India and Pakistan—and the strain the attacks placed
on the U.S.-Pakistan partnership. The LeT was able to exploit existing
diplomatic tensions, geographic boundaries, and political rivalries to
leverage blind spots and amplify operational and strategic effects.41
As noted in the introduction, although this single example of the 2008
attacks in Mumbai does not provide an exhaustive list of how all armed
groups can use the environment to their favor and of all the seams and
gaps they can possibly exploit, this article is intended to provide a jumping-off point for further research, analysis, and debate on some of the
most pressing issues facing states today; such as, where and how to focus
scarce resources in order to close seams and hopefully exploit gaps
against innovation and surprise by armed groups.
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